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COMMENTARY
PROCESS AND PROPERTY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
FRANK I. MICHELMAN*
C OULD PROPERTY BE A "PROCESS RIGHT"? "Property" does denote,
among other things, a class or cluster of legal rights. In appropriate
contexts, it plainly means a class or cluster of constitutional rights. But
could the constitutional right of property possibly be a "process," as op-
posed to a "substantive," right?
The distinction between "substantive" and "process" rights appears
in John Ely's recent work of constitutional theory, Democracy and
Distrust.' His thesis reflects a more fundamental distinction between
substantive and process values, or goals. These two classes of values or
goals are, in Ely's conception, strictly relative to one another: Substan-
tive values are values deemed "so important that they must be in-
sulated from whatever inhibition the political process might impose,
whereas a participational [or process goal is concerned] . . . with how
decisions effecting [substantive] value choices ... are made."' Process is
to substance as method is to result. Thus, substantive rights are rights
respecting political outcomes, while process rights are rights respecting
modes of participation in the politics that determine outcomes. That the
categories are strictly relative to one another is easily seen by an exam-
ple. Suppose a duly constituted state legislature enacts a statute declar-
ing that chaps with mustaches may not vote in municipal elections. If
they make legal objections, what kinds of rights are they asserting?3
A number of Ely's critics argue that even this strictly stipulative and
relativistic distinction between substantive and process rights (or
values) is illusory or misleading.' Their criticism is a matter to which I
want to return.' For now, I want to accept Ely's distinction as he offers
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School; B.A., Yale University;
LL.B., Harvard University Law School.
I J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ELY].
Id. at 75 n.*.
The answer, I believe, is both kinds.
See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text.
6 See text accompanying note 56-64, infra.
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it, and ask where property fits into such a picture.
The question is, I believe, of more than exegetical interest. To help
clarify its deeper significance, let us consider two contrasting concep-
tions of a constitution or constitutional order, which we may call a
"higher law" conception and a "popular sovereignty" conception. In the
higher law conception, the Constitution is concerned largely with
designating certain rights or values as prior and superior to the political
order- as beyond the reach of political decision and entitled to prevail
in spite of any contrary popular will.
In the contrasting popular sovereignty conception, the Constitution is
concerned precisely with "constituting" a system of democratic partici-
pation and representation, one in which even the most basic values and
principles of civic ordering-of rights and wrongs, property and con-
tract, institutions and relations-are always open to political determina-
tion, by the people, through law-making. Of course, the written Consti-
tution does include mention of what looks like fundamental, substantive
or higher law rights; but in the purest popular sovereignty view, we are
to understand that these rights are established for the sake of-as sec-
ondary to-the democratic integrity of the political process. The con-
stitutional right of freedom of expression, for example, may resemble a
substantive or outcome right, but in the popular sovereignty conception
it functions as a political right, a condition of a fair or good political pro-
cess. Freedom of expression may thus stand as a paradigm of a process
right in substantive dress."
My question about the possibility of property as a process right is
just one about whether, in a popular sovereignty conception of the con-
stitutional order, one can make the same kind of sense of the right of
property as of freedom of expression. Can one see it as a right having a
clear, concrete content and function, in a constitutional system that is
deeply committed to popular sovereignty? It has been more usual in our
constitutional tradition to think of property as a kind of higher-law,
substantive principle, locked in a struggle with popular sovereignty. As
Justice Holmes classically put the matter, "[the police power] must have
its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone."7 If property
is truly a constitutional right, Holmes meant, the Constitution must be a
higher law instrument concerned with placing some rights above and
beyond politics.
The thesis of this Commentary is that Holmes was wrong-that the
constitutional right to property is well understandable as one of the
preconditions of a fair democratic system for the determination of the
principles of social ordering through public decision.
6 It hardly needs noting that such a strictly process-oriented view of freedom
of expression is not necessarily an adequate view. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (1978), and authorities cited therein; ELY, supra note
1, at 93-94.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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Now, our day's great and sophisticated defense of a pro-popular
sovereignty, anti-higher law conception of constitutional order is em-
bodied in Professor Ely's book. Ely insists on distinguishing between
substantive and process values-despite the distinction's vulnerability
to a logical critique that he is too perceptive not to appreciate-is
rooted in a conviction that in any democracy worthy of the name sub-
stantive value choices are presumptively for legislatures, not courts, to
make, and that, conversely, judges, being lawyers, are specially
qualified to say whether the procedures conform to constitutional stan-
dards of fair and equal participation in the process of political value
choice. Ely claims that such a division-of-labor judgment is reflected in
the Constitution as written.' He must and does admit that the instru-
ment establishes individual rights judicially enforceable against the
political branches of government; but he insists that these are rights,
for the most part, to effective participation and equal consideration in
public decision-making, not to substantive outcomes required by particu-
lar preferred values.
Consider next the Constitution's restrictions on deprivations of liberty
and property, and on public takings of property." Why are these restric-
tions not fatal counter-examples to Ely's characterization of the Consti-
tution as, in general, concerned with process, not substance? "Liberty"
and "property" seem to define, exactly and exhaustively, the field of in-
dividual substantive rights. They are the very words which, above all
others, our legal tradition has used to mark the sphere in which indi-
vidual will and private preference are sovereign, in which legislation
that would override the choices of individuals is, for just that reason,
presumptively objectionable.
Ely's response is that the Constitution confers no absolute right of
liberty or property, but only (1) a right against deprivation without due
process of law - a process right on its face if ever there was one - and (2)
a right against uncompensated takings which itself is a guaranty of fair
process:" By making the public fisc bear the burden of paying for prop-
erty taken, the compensation clause blocks one easy means by which the
majority can irresponsibly disregard a minority's interests. 2
This response is, I believe, not quite adequate to serve Ely's purpose.
That purpose, as we have noted, is to provide a reading of the Constitu-
s Compare notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text, with ELY, supra note 1,
at 75 n.*.
See ELY, supra note 1, at 88-101.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall .. .be deprived of life,
liberty, or property . . . ; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Id. Amendment XIV provides: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" See ELY, supra note 1, at 14-21.
" See ELY, supra note 1, at 97-98.
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tion that relieves judges of fundamental value judgments and confines
them to the policing of process. Suppose we grant that a guaranty
against deprivation without due process, or against taking without com-
pensation, is directly concerned with mediate process rather than final
outcome. How does it follow that judicial substantive value judgement
had been avoided? It remains necessary, does it not, to determine
whether a deprivation or taking of property or liberty is involved in any
particular case?
To take the clearest possible example, in the 1850's a slaveholder's
legal protest against the idea of abolition without compensation would
plainly have presented a question of fundamental values. True, that par-
ticular question has since been settled by the thirteenth amendment,
but a multitude of similar questions remain. Property in humans is
disallowed, but what about property in animals, or clouds? Would
statutory emancipation of all laboratory mammals raise a taking issue?
Would a seizure of contraband rabbits without notice and hearing raise
a due process issue? What about state-authorized cloud seeding?"3 What
of Justice Thurgood Marshall's declared view that every citizen has a
due-process protected property interest in being hired for a government
job?" All such questions are unanswerable without the aid of value
judgments, because "property," the operative constitutional word, is far
from self-defining.
Ely would avoid the difficulty by taking us back to the good old days
when property was not a constitutionally operative word-when "the
phrase 'life, liberty, and property' was read as a unit and given an open-
ended, functional interpretation, which meant that the government
couldn't seriously hurt you without due process of law .... [I]f you were
seriously hurt by the state you were entitled to due process."15 Ely
thinks the contemporary Supreme Court has brought us unnecessary
value-judgment trouble by reading the due process clause literally"8 to
condition the claim to due process on there being at stake an interest
that qualifies either as life, or liberty or property-it being understood
that there are some significant interests that are none of the above.
Plainly enough courts can, by eliding the three constitutional
categories into one-"lifelibertyorproperty," or "substantial
interest" -avoid any need to say what property is. But the need for
value judgments will remain having just been shifted to some phase no
more informative than "property"- something like "grievous loss" or
"seriously hurt you.""1 How, for example, is Justice Marshall's proposi-
13 Cf. Pa. Nat'l Weath. Ass'n v. Blue Ridge Weath. Modif. Ass'n, 44 Pa. D. &
C.2d 749 (1968).
" See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 ELY, supra note 1, at 19 (footnote omitted).
'e See ELY, supra note 1, at 19-21.
For example, Justice Frankfurter termed the standard "grievous loss" in
Joint Anti-Facist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
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tion concerning a citizen's right to public employment any easier to deal
with under Ely's formulation'8 than under the Court's?'9
The framers did not use the terms "seriously hurt," "grievous loss" or
"lifelibertyorproperty." They chose the phrase "life, liberty, or property,"
and Ely hardly pauses to say why we should be excused from taking
seriously their word choice and their grammar," even if that does leave
us, and the courts, stuck with value judgments about what counts as
property.
One imagines that from the standpoint of the Framers there was no
such problem-that they simply understood property to mean claims on
material wealth of whatever description, including the then conven-
tional non-possessory and incorporeal forms such as future interests,
easements, and franchises and contracts. The Framers may have had no
problem with the idea of each identifiable item of wealth being disting-
uishably the property of some specific person. In any given case it might
have seemed obvious what "the property" in question consisted of and
who, if anyone, owned it. Property, then, would have been envisioned as
a finite set of standard types of interests that people might have in
items of material or conventional wealth and, therefore, there would be
no problem in determining when a taking or deprivation of property
occurred.
We have long since departed that state of cognitive grace." For us as
lawyers, property has become a purely analytical notion with no com-
pelling intuitive content. The word property, the Supreme Court advised,
is used in the Constitution not in the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the
physical thing.... [Instead, it]... denote[s] the group of rights inhering in
the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it."" Thus, property has come to signify abstract legal rela-
tions on the order of rights, powers, privileges and immunities.
Specifically the question of what relations or relational complexes count
as property has no well-defined answer. "The Constitutional provision is
addressed to every [ie., each] sort of interest the citizen may possess.''23
We can speculate with some confidence as to how this derangement of
legal perspectives on property has come to pass. The process has, I
believe, been one of common-sense notions dissolving in the crucible of
case-by-case adjudication in a modernizing world. For example, in ad-
judicating "takings" claims, courts inevitably meet borderline cases like
concurring).
18 When the government refused to hire you, has it seriously hurt you?
' When the government refused to hire you, has it deprived you of property?
20 See ELY, supra note 1, at 192 n.28, for his suggestion on this point.
21 See generally Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century,
29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980), an article to which my argument in the preceding
and the following paragraphs is heavily indebted.
2 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
22 Id at 378.
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United States v. Causby.2 ' Does the government take your property
when it flies bombers so low and frequently over your poultry farm that
the birds, crazed by noise and vibration, stop laying and brain
themselves against their coops? In order to resolve these problems in a
judicially responsibile way, the judges have had to enunciate some
general principles for distinguishing takings of property from other
events, which means that judges have to attribute some persuasive
political purpose or value to the constitutional guaranty against un-
compensated takings. As a result, the most evident constitutional pur-
poses have clashed with common-sense notions of property.
There could be no better illustration than Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon." In a common-sense view, there is no taking under a statute for-
bidding owners of underground coal deposits from mining their coal,
when doing so would endanger nearby houses. 6 The coal, after all, re-
mains legally theirs and in their possession. At the same time, to deny
absolutely that a restriction on use might amount to a taking of prop-
erty seems arbitrary, given the apparent purpose of the just compensa-
tion clause to prevent unfair concentration on a few of the costs of
government actions supposedly taken in the interest of all.2 This ar-
bitrariness can be avoided by making the word property stand for any
identifiable modicum of established legal entitlement-a move that
enables one to say that the state takes the coal company's property
when it denies the company's legal privilege to remove the coal from
the ground. It is under such pressures, perhaps, that we have moved
from a common-sense to an artificial, from a concrete to an abstract,
from an intuitive to an analytical conception of property.
Such a conceptual shift comes at a high price. Dissolved into the
Hohfeldian relations,2 8 and thus rendered applicable to any legally est-
ablished entitlement whatever, the category property is also rendered
useless as a limiting term in constitutional adjudication. If, to use the
Supreme Court's words, "every sort of interest" counts as property,
then not every governmental destruction or negation of one can count
as a deprivation or a taking, at least not without paralysis of govern-
ment.' Yet it is unclear how courts can tell where on the continuum of
21 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
25 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Perhaps Bruce Ackerman's judgment about the common-sense view of this
case would differ from mine. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CON-
STITUTION 136-45 (1977).
" See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, - U.S. -. 101 S. Ct.
1287, 1306 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 That is, "rights," "powers," "privileges" and "immunities." See generally
W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING (W. Cook ed. 1919); Kennedy and Michelman, Are Property and Con-
tract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 751 nn. (1980).
See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980).
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damage "deprivation" or "taking" sets in, or-to vary the
metaphor-how courts can even say what factors get weighed in the
balance. What does seem clear is that courts cannot make such deter-
minations without overt or covert appeal to value judgments, of a kind
for which the purely analytical conception of property provides no clue.
Well, all right, yes, so value judgments are required in applying the
property clauses"0 of the Constitution. But do they have to be the
Court's value judgments? If there is some way the Court can refer the
necessary value judgments back to the legislatures, and still give the
constitutional property clauses some bite, all would be well with Ely's
world. And is there not such a way, and has not the contemporary
Supreme Court espoused it, and is it not ironic that for its pains the
Court has earned a pen-lashing from Professor Ely?
What the contemporary Court has done is stated that a person ad-
versely affected by official action is entitled to due process if that action
deprives that person of property-and that, for this purpose, property
means any claimed entitlement, but only those entitlements for which
legal recognition can plausibly be found in existing law apart from the
constitutional due process guaranty itself." Similarly, the Court has said
that governmental activity that injuriously affects, but does not formal-
ly expropriate, a person's holdings can amount to a compensable taking
of property only if it contravenes specific "investment backed expecta-
tions" that were reasonable under the nonconstitutional law as it stood
when the investment occurred." The Court is thus apparently trying to
ensure that the value judgments required for determining whether
property, in the constitutional sense, is at stake in a given case are
ultimately under legislative rather than judicial control. The Court's at-
tempt, however, has not been successful. In practice, the Court has been
unwilling or unable to live by its own declared rule of self-denial. It is
easy to cite cases in which the Court has required a due process hearing
although no positive-law entitlement can clearly and convincingly be
made out,3 and in which the Court has required payment of compensa-
tion for damage to interests which prior standing law did not purport to
protect."'
I' This term refers to the due process and the taking clauses set out in note
10 supra.
" See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972). For Ely's critique, see ELY, supra
note 1, at 19.
" See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25, 136
(1978); see also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
' Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
' Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). See Michelman,
Property As A Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1098, 1106-07. I
believe such judicial value judgments are inevitable. See id. at 1105-09;
1982]
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It does not follow yet that Ely's goose is cooked. Ely's position is not
that the Constitution never calls upon judges to enunciate and enforce
value judgments, including some that are contrary to the legislature's.
Judicially uttered counter-legislative judgments are what constitutional
process rights, and process values, are all about. Judically uttered does
not mean judicially authored; and counter-legislative need not mean, in
the deepest sense, counter-majoritarian.
Judges, Ely argues, can take their values from the Constitu-
tion-from its perceived, pervasive meaning and purpose, when specific
texts fall short. In Ely's perception, that pervasive purpose is equal
political participation. Thus, Ely might have salvaged property for his
theory just as he salvaged free speech and privileges-or-immunities. His
position then would have been that judges, in supplying content to the
property clauses by deciding in particular cases whether a deprivation
or taking of property has occurred, should do so not by asking whether the
challenged official action impairs some particular substantive value, but
rather by asking whether that action has unduly constricted the "oppor-
tunity to participate ... in the political process by which values are ap-
propriately identified and accommodated."35 Property, according to Ely,
must be a process right.
But what can it mean to see and to understand property, of all things,
as a process right? I have suggested. before that property is "an essen-
tial component of individual competence in social and political life," a
"material foundation" for "self-determination and self-expression," "an
indispensable ingredient in the constitution of the individual as a par-
ticipant in the life of the society, including not least the society's pro-
cesses for collectively regulating the conditions of an ineluctably social
existence.''3
Or consider a more graphic version of one aspect of the idea:
Without basic education ... what hope is there of effective parti-
cipation in the ... political system? ... But ... then what about
life itself, health and vigor, presentable attire, or shelter not only
from the elements but from the physical and psychological on-
slaughts of social debilitation? Are not these interests the univ-
ersal rock-bottom prerequisites of effective participation in
democratic representation? . . . One might as well say to those
who are under-represented in a malapportioned legislature that
their remedy lies through legislative politics, as say to those
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977), Ely seems to think
so, too, though for somewhat different reasons. See note 45 infra and accompany-
ing text.
ELY, supra note 1, at 77.
3 Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296, 304 (1980).
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who lack access to the basic necessities of life that their right of
democratic participation is not constricted. 7
It is not my chief purpose here to expound on Ely's theory, or to show
that it can accommodate the problem of "supplying content" to the prop-
erty clauses. There are reasons quite independent of his theory, and its
internal needs, for regarding property as a process right.
Let us, then, begin anew. It is undisputed that the Constitution
recognizes and offers protection in some form to rights under the name
of property. At the very least, private property is not to be formally ex-
propriated without a fair procedural opportunity to contest the depriva-
tion.
Suppose we now ask: Does the Constitution in any sense, or to any ex-
tent, guarantee that there will be any property to expropriate, or to
withdraw without due process? Stated in a somewhat different manner:
Does the Constitution establish a public right to the existence of a
private property system respecting any given class of valued objects,
as it does, apparently, establish a public right to a system of
nonestablishment of religion?'
Clearly, none of the constitutional texts in which the word property
appears purport to establish such a public, or as it might be called,
systemic right. All they say is that insofar as there happens to be any
property, and you happen to have some, you won't lose what you have at
the hands of the government without due process and/or just compensa-
tion. That proposition would be fully met in a property-less world,
assuming for the moment such a world is conceivable. A fortiori, it does
not affirmatively require that the standing laws of the country establish
a private-property regime over any given class of possible objects of
ownership.
There is, to be sure, one constitutional text that might conceivably be
read as establishing a systemic right of property, namely, the guaranty
in Article IV, section 4 of a republican form of government. That a
republican government entails a propertied citizenry is a highly plausi-
ble and appealing proposition, for reasons which will be discussed
later. 9 It is not easy, however, to turn that proposition into a judicially
enforceable right. The problem is that the notion of private property is
radically indeterminate and incurably contested. Who can say with any
certainty what kinds of legally established relations, respecting what
kinds of interests in what kinds of objects, constitute the necessary and
sufficient conditions of private property system?
Is it, for example, a private property system if the law allows you to
own land, but only for life and not in fee, or with no cause of action
against those who negligently harm the land, crops and improvements,
" Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 659, 677-78.
Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8 See notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
1982]
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or totally subject to invasion, dispossession or regulation by the state?
Is it a private property system if the law allows a household member to
acquire something that looks like ownership of assets in fee, but pro-
vides that they are then automatically owned in common by all the
members of that household? The testing questions could go on forever,
but perhaps I have offered enough to indicate that the criteria of a
private property system may fairly be deemed nonjusticiable, a classic
political question."0 I proceed, accordingly, on the assumption that there
can be no pure, high-law systemic right of property under the Constitu-
tion.
Still, it is common ground that the Constitution recognizes and offers
protection in some form to rights under the name of property. How can
that be so, without it also being true that the Constitution tells us what
rights it recognizes under that name? The most obvious solution is that
the constitutional right of property is strictly parasitic on non-
constitutional positive law. Such a parasitic constitutional right would
make no demands on the content of the standing general laws, such as,
that those laws must establish, as to some range of valued objects or op-
portunities, a regime of legal relations intuitively recognizable as
private property. Rather, the parasitic conception would allow that
those laws may, as of any given moment, provide or not provide for any
form of private entitlement respecting any class of objects. The right
would attach to whatever such entitlements the standing general law
does happen to establish. It would protect those and only those com-
mitments against certain kinds and modes of governmental impairment.
Such a constitutional right, although utterly dependent on non-
constitutional law, cannot be brushed aside as empty or pointless. As
Justice Stewart once explained, "it is a purpose of the ancient institu-
tion of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."' Since
daily commitments are supposedly influenced by contemporaneous legal
rules, an obvious purpose of constitutional safeguards is to guard
against uncompensated defeat of expectations fairly engendered by
those rules.
The parasitic conception of constitutional property rights is not a
mere hypothetical possibility. It is, as we have seen, the conception ac-
tually professed by the contemporary Supreme Court."2 Were it a
tenable and satisfying conception, this Commentary would have come to
an end. The evidence is strong, however-in the forms of external
" For more elaborate discussion, see Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the
Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1982).
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
2 See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:577
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criticism and internal irresolution- that the parasitic conception is
neither tenable nor satisfying. To a chorusof critics, the parasitic con-
ception of constitutionally protected property appears doomed to self-
defeating circularity, avoidable only by arbitrarily selective nonapplica-
tion.'3 The core of the difficulty, as the critics see it, is this: As to any
given case of injurious governmental action, either the nonconsitutional
positive law provides for compensation or due process, or it does not. If
it does, then the constitutional compensation or due process guaranty is
redundant. If it does not, then there is no positive law entitlement not
to be thus injured without compensation or due process, and, under the
parasitic conception, no constitutionally protected property is at issue.
As Ely has somewhat sarcastically stated: "It turns out ... that whether
it's a property interest is a function of whether you're entitled to it,
which means the Court has to decide whether you're entitled to it
before it can decide whether you get a hearing on the question whether
you're entitled to it.""
Circularity and self-defeatingness aside,'5 it is extremely doubtful that
a strictly parasitic conception of constitutionally protected property,
offering no protection against legal redefinition of property rights to
the point of extinction, could every be quite acceptable either to the
observant public or to the Court itself. 6 From Truax v. Corrigan7 and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'8 to Fuentes v. Shevin,4 9 Arnett v. Ken-
nedy,' Goss v. Lopez,"1 Kaiser Aetna v. United States,2 and Pruneyard-
Shipping Center v. Robins,5" the Court has expressed or betrayed its un-
13 E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525, 533-35 (1978); Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 462-70 (1977).
" ELY, supra note 1, at 19.
,5 Not everyone is so sure of the validity of this charge. See Michelman, For-
mal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS:
NOMOS XVIII 133-34 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 438-39 (1977).
6 See Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1097 (1981); see also Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 355, 358, 361, 372-81 (1978); Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOX XVIII (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property'" 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405 (1977).
' 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
" 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
5 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
12 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
- 447 U.S. 74, 84, 88-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 93-95 (Marshall, J., concurr-
ing) (1980).
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willingness to abandon the idea that some rights or interests are pro-
tected property by direct mandate of the Constitution, regardless of
nonconstitutional positive law.
But then we have a puzzle on our hands. We have arrived at the
following two positions: (1) The Constitution mandates recognition and
protection, as property, of some rights or interests regardless of their
status in non-constitutional positive law; and (2) there is no constitu-
tional right to the establishment of a private property system, and such
a right might well be nonjusticiable. How can these two propositions co-
exist? If the Constitution cannot be read to tell the judges what a
private property system is in essence, how are the judges suppose to
identify the rights the Constitution tells us to protect as property
without regard to non-constitutional law? If the constitutional property
right is neither determined by the particulars of the positive law, nor
determinative of the system of positive law, then what are the relation-
ships among these three entity-classes, viz., positive-law particulars,
constitutional property rights and positive-law system?
One possible answer is that constitutional property rights are relative
to, and determined by, the prevailing legal and institutional system as a
whole. Thus, the constitutional rights would not be immutable higher
law prescribing that system. Rather they, along with the system, would
be historically contingent and changeable. Neither, however, would the
constitutional property rights be fully and strictly determined by specific
portions of positive law. The assumption is that on some occasions it
would be possible to say that particular positive law, in denying or
negating some claimed entitlement to use or control of a resource, con-
tradicts the implications of the institutional system as a whole that the
claim should be recognized and protected. That claim, then, would be a
constitutionally protected property right.
For such a conception to work, property must represent a value of a
certain kind; that is, a value whose concrete implications for legal en-
titlement so clearly are inferrable from, and vary with, the general state
of social and economic afairs and institutions, that specific legal rules
can sometimes be judged disconsonant with those concrete implications.
It follows, I think, that property must represent a value that is, in the
loosest possible sense, comparative or competitive-whose worth to the
individual is in some way relative to the endowments of others -so that
specific withdrawals or denials can be judged unfair or disadvantageous.
It follows then, that property is a process right; an "ingredient in the
constitution of the individual as a participant in the life of the society,
including not least the society's processes for regulating the conditions
of an ineluctably social existence.""
Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan:. A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 296, 304 (1980).
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Rather crude illustrations of the idea are all that I can muster at this
stage of its development. Consider the question of constitutionality of
legal rules allowing self-help repossession of automobiles sold on
secured credit and held for personal use. The approach suggested would
indicate that it should make a difference whether we were in a society
in which legs, two-wheeled vehicles and public transit were the stan-
dard modes of locomotion, or rather in a society like our own, where
lack of a personal automobile is probably an isolating condition, a signifi-
cant impairment of one's ability to engage in the normal round of social,
economic and political intercourse. (It is worth wondering how the ap-
proach would apply to the consumer durables in Fuentes v. Shevin5 -the
legendary stove and stereo.)
Now, what precedes is far short of a logical demonstration of the
necessity of regarding property, in its constitutional usage, as a process
right. At most I have shown that there are some grounds for so regard-
ing it, that one could adopt it if so minded. But why should one be so
minded? What's so hot about process rights?
Let us take note of what isn't so hot about them. I agree completely
with Ely's critics such as Laurence Tribe5" and Paul Brest, 57 when they
suggest that the need for substantive, political value judgments is in no
way avoided or lessened by casting constitutional issues in terms of pro-
cess rather than result. A part of their point is sufficiently illustrated
by the hypothetical mustache-disfranchisment law:' Does it not affect
substantive rights? How can we distinguish it from a law disfranchising
children, or felons, without resort to substantive value judgments?
Tribe and Brest convincingly show that Ely falls victim to his own at-
tack, i.e.., that his critique of fundamental values analysis of issues in
constitutional law applies in full force to the choices that judges have to
make in carrying out the constitutional program according to Ely-that
of facilitating the fair operation of political processes and assuring fair
consideration of minority interests. Process talk and process rights are
not intrinsically any more objective than substance talk and substantive
rights. Even so, it does seem that, in practice, process talk can often
help disputant progress towards mutually acceptable resolutions of dif-
ficult issues. Why so?
Perhaps the answer lies in part in two related values, impulses or
compulsions, that may be called reasoned discourse and autonomy-of-
law. These are legalistic impulses, in the sense that they are liable to be
found not only in lawyers but in lay conversation about law. They are
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
" See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Processed-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
57 Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981).
" See notes 3, 4 supra and accompanying text.
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also, however, humanistic impulses. It seems to be simply descriptive of
our nature as social beings that reason-giving is an essential part of pur-
posive conversation. This is so despite an overall willingness to acknow-
ledge that the giving of reasons can neither reach an end nor go on
forever. One wants, simply, to present an argument for one's recom-
mended conclusion. All the better if the argument is rooted in grounds to
which one's co-conversationalists are committed. This helps explain
why, during conversations about legal matters, one seeks grounds sup-
plied by the acknowledged law itself and, to that extent at least, ex-
periences or imagines the autonomy of law.
In legal as well as in other discourse one reaches for argument, for
rationalization, for the unification of arguments across topics which in
the unattainable limit would become true objectivity. 9 Add to that sim-
ple bit of sociology the apparent fact that the Constitution is seemingly
occupied, if not preoccupied, with matters of process. A unified or inte-
grated constitutional discourse would then, tend to be pervasively, if
not exclusively, a process-oriented discourse. And that, I suggest, is a
factor that might help explain the allure of constitutional processism.
But of course we know from Ely that the alluring is also the impossi-
ble,"0 and constitutional processism is no exception. As duly skeptical
denizens of a post-Realist age, we know that any apparent pre-
occupation with process we may detect in the Constitution is not, in the
final analysis, objectively in the document but rather imputed to it by
us. It is historically or, as some might prefer to say, ideologically con-
tingent. In other words, the Tribe-Best critique - viz., Ely himself can't
get anywhere without substantive value choices-it is not only internal
to Ely's process-rights program but external to it as well: To see the
constitutional program as one of process-rights is itself an act of value
choice. 1 I, again, agree; and yet, again, there seems to be a pragmatic
virtue in process talk: a virtue of sometimes making worthwhile conver-
sation possible, of feeling right and persuasive when talk about pre-
ferred results would feel weak and arbitrary, or futile and hopeless, in
the face of disagreement.
For illustration, consider the idea of property as a process right. That
idea posits a connection between franchise and property. The strongest
possible connection would be one to the effect that (as Dad was told by
" Professor Duncan Kennedy uses the term "integration." D. KENNEDY, THE
RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53
IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
61 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 56, at 1077-79; Parker, The Past of Constitu-
tional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
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Mother) you can't have one without the other.2 Suppose the issue is:
what property rights do people have? The issue is not resolved and the
need for value judgment is not obviated by switching into a process
mode. For let it be granted, with respect to franchise and property, that
you cannot have one without the other. The question remains: all, or
nothing? Is it love, and therefore marriage; or is it no marriage, so no
love?
We can detect in our tradition two schools of thought on this matter.
Let me call them the "Whig" school and the "Democratic Humanist"
school. Both schools could march under banners reading "no franchise
without estate."6 3 They would mean, however, different things by their
identical mottos.
In the Whig view, whether one has estate, and if so how much, is
one's own look-out. Further, since no one ought to have a public voice
wanting estate, because he would be irresponsible and uninformed, it
follows whiggishly that if you lack estate, you are disqualified from the
franchise. Society, then, is no more responsible for your franchise than
you for your material holdings. What you properly make your own, it
protects, and that is all. In the Humanist view, by contrast, each citizen
begins with a claim on the franchise, because public voice and participa-
tion are deemed essential ingredients of human personality. The motto
then means that each is similarly entitled to whatever estate is required
in order to make voice effective (reputable, educated or audible).
In short, for Whiggs, the motto-"no franchise without estate"-func-
tions as an argument for selective disfranchisement whereas the
Humanist motto signifies an argument for universal material entitle-
ment. The roots of the conflict lie deep inside the respective moralities
of the two views, in their respective conceptions of what it is to be
human and to be free. For the Whig, being human essentially means
owning yourself while freedom essentially means independence from
the wills of others; hence the very ideas of franchise and of group deci-
sion, are for Whigs problematic and, at best, instrumental. You have a vote
if you have a proper stake in its exercise and your situation is such that
you can be relied upon to use it responsibly and prudently. For the
democratic Humanist, by contrast, franchise is essential and constitu-
tive, since to be human essentially means to be an active participant in
civic life, and to be free means to be in equal political association with
your fellows.
One does not imagine that talking process can magically resolve such
cosmic issues as that between the Whig and the Humanist. And yet it
2 Mother was, of course, speaking of love and marriage, not franchise and
property.
Compare to the old revolutionary slogan, "No taxation without representa-
tion!"
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does seem that one who wanted to persuade an audience of judges or
legislators in favor of, say, generous welfare or entitlements might do
better by appealing to intuitions about fair process than by asserting an
outcome-oriented right to, say, "life."
Allow, for just a moment, that this is so as a matter of social fact. (I
shall shortly return to the question of why it is so.) Such a social fact,
assuming it exists, certainly seems to justify constitutional processism.
After all, constitutional adjudication, insofar as it ultimately succeeds,
has to succeed as dialogue. It therefore requires premises that not only
are discernible in the extant authoritative materials, and consonant
with the intuitive political morality of the country as that comes to light
in political disputation, including constitutional argument and much else
besides, but also are potentially critical of the existing order." Constitu-
tional adjudication is an activity requiring a normative language that
hooks into contemporary inclinations of political morality firmly enough
to allow for some critical tension without ripping out the hook. It seems
that in a liberal political culture, that language is often going to be the
language of process. So insofar as it is true that Process is just another
name for Substance -insofar as any value conflict is freely translatable
from one category into the other-it behooves adjudicators (and their
fellow travelers, the advocates, commentators and theorists) to know
how and when to make the necessary translations.
What I have just said will seem to depreciate the process-based ap-
proach, reducing it to a matter of culturally contingent rhetorical
prudence. In truth I think there is more than that to be said on its
behalf, which we can perhaps get at by asking what might lie behind the
feelings and experiences to which I have called attention, that we can
sometimes make headway talking process when we can't get anywhere
talking substance. Those feelings and experiences have, of course, some
well-known sinister interpretations. They are called a form of false con-
sciousness, or apologetics, or reflections of a mystifying dualism in
liberal thought- meaning, among other things, that people whose true
interest is in resisting substantive injustice can be fooled into thinking
that there are such things as fair procedures and as long as the pro-
cedures are fair they have nothing to complain about. That there is in
such cautionary views of process talk a truth worth learning I do not
deny. I doubt, however, that they are the whole truth. For there is also
a benign interpretation of the gratifying quality of process talk; that is,
that it fits a self-concept ideal, a preferred sense of ourselves as
members of a Kingdom of Ends6 -as individuals not only rational but
" See R. Parker, Constitutional Vision (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
5 The phrase, of course, is Kant's. See, I. KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 100-02 (H. Paton tr. 1, 3d ed. 1956). The construal is chief-
ly from R. WOLFF. THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 191-93 (1968).
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reasonable, in principle capable through a proper dialogue of arriving at
positions of true mutual respect and accommodation, and capable
through a proper pooling of judgment of arriving at a common interest.
In other words, our susceptibility to process talk might be a reflection
of aspirations far from ignoble.
That suggestion is not, of course, without its apparent problems. For
one, I see that the benign view of process talk is itself open to the
charge of false consciousness-mine, in this instance-though I don't
quite see what I'm supposed to do about it. For another, the notion that
reasoning together is a high human calling could perhaps be said to
have about it a certain aura that John Ely (not meaning flattery) calls
"the smell of the lamp.""6 But that, I suggest, is as much Professor Ely's
problem as it is mine.
Ely, supra note 1, at 94.
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